eas-simulator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to read and analyze simulator logs and crash reports, creating a surface for untrusted data ingestion.
- Ingestion points: The
sim_api /logsandsim_api /crashesroutes inreferences/logs-and-crashes.mdfetch content directly from the remote simulator environment. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions that may be embedded in processed log data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution via
Bash, network utilities likecurl, and the ability to run arbitrary packages vianpx. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the ingested log content is described before processing by the agent.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on
npx --yesto fetch and execute CLI tools includingeas-cli,agent-device,expo, andsubmit-expo-feedbackat runtime, creating a dependency on the external NPM registry. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
simulator:execcommand is used to execute arbitrary shell commands within a session-specific environment, and the skill also invokes local build tools likexcodebuildandpod install. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Application artifacts are downloaded from the vendor's domain (
expo.dev) usingcurland theagent-device install-from-sourcecommand. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Instructions in
references/run-your-app.mdregarding "Tunnel scope and approvals" direct the agent to carry initial user consent as persistent "existing authorization" for subsequent high-risk actions like starting tunnels and fetching code, which could reduce user oversight during the session.
Audit Metadata