competitor-monitoring
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function involves ingesting untrusted data from external websites (blogs, social media, news) to generate summaries and briefings, which is a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Data is collected from company websites, LinkedIn, news articles, and review sites (G2, Capterra) via the
research_proagent as described in theWorkflowandStep 3sections ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The prompts provided in the column configuration (e.g., the
News Summaryprompt) do not explicitly define boundary markers or instructions to disregard embedded malicious commands within the fetched content. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to create and update tables via the
extruct-api. It does not have direct access to the file system, shell, or sensitive credentials. - Sanitization: There are no defined sanitization or filtering steps for the content fetched from the web before it is passed to the LLM for synthesis in the
news_summarycolumn.
Audit Metadata