post-engagers

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow instructs the agent to execute shell commands that incorporate user-supplied input, specifically LinkedIn URLs (e.g., python3 revops/content/fetch_interactions.py "<post_url>"). If the agent does not properly escape the input, a malicious user could provide a URL containing shell metacharacters to execute arbitrary commands on the host system.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to scrape untrusted user-generated content (comments, reactions, and reposts) from LinkedIn, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data is fetched from external LinkedIn posts via fetch_interactions.py and stored in content.db (file: SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions or delimiters defined to isolate the scraped content or warn the agent against following instructions embedded in the data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute local Python scripts, perform database operations, and make network requests to third-party APIs (Fullenrich, Attio, Extruct) (file: SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not mention any sanitization, filtering, or validation of the scraped text before it is stored or used for further enrichment and CRM synchronization.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 26, 2026, 03:42 PM