agent-browser
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external websites, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious web content could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The
snapshotandgetcommands (e.g.,agent-browser snapshot,agent-browser get text) inSKILL.mdingest content from arbitrary web pages into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands when processing data from these snapshots.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to click, fill forms, navigate URLs, and take screenshots, which could be abused if the agent inadvertently follows instructions hidden within a webpage's accessibility tree or text.
- Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the content retrieved from the browser before it is processed by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions include downloading an external CLI tool and browser binaries from a public registry.
- Evidence: The setup section in
SKILL.mddocuments the use ofnpm install -g agent-browserto install the tool andagent-browser installto download the Chromium browser. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by executing shell commands to control the browser automation tool.
- Evidence: Numerous examples in
SKILL.mddemonstrate the use of CLI commands such asagent-browser open,agent-browser click, andagent-browser fillto perform tasks.
Audit Metadata