skills/eyadsibai/ltk/codex/Gen Agent Trust Hub

codex

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONMETADATA_POISONINGEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions specify that the agent should 'Complete tasks without seeking approval for each step' and 'proceed autonomously' for the majority of tasks, which is a direct attempt to bypass safety guidelines and human oversight.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The integration defines a 'Danger-Full-Access' flag that grants the agent network and system-level permissions, significantly increasing the potential impact of malicious or erroneous commands.\n- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill uses deceptive triggers and references non-existent models like 'gpt-5.2', which may lead the agent to invoke the skill for inappropriate tasks or rely on exaggerated capabilities.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the installation of the @openai/codex package via the NPM registry and the codex formula via Homebrew.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to analyze and process external codebases which could contain malicious instructions.\n
  • Ingestion points: Reads files in the workspace for analysis and modification (SKILL.md).\n
  • Boundary markers: None identified.\n
  • Capability inventory: Full file system access, network access, and system-level command execution via the danger-full-access mode.\n
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the processed code is mentioned.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 23, 2026, 06:07 PM