html-slideshow-deck
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from external sources like codebases, articles, and notes to generate slide content.
- Ingestion points: External text and code provided by the user as source material for generating slides (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or boundary markers to isolate external content from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent is empowered to write HTML files to the local file system and use platform tools to publish these files (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: The risk is mitigated by explicit instructions to distill content rather than quote it verbatim and by the mandatory use of
textContentandcreateElementto prevent XSS vulnerabilities in the output. - [SAFE]: The skill enforces robust security requirements for its generated artifacts, including a strict prohibition on using
innerHTMLwith variable data and a requirement to prefixlocalStoragekeys to prevent cross-artifact data access. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill allows generated HTML to fetch font assets from Google Fonts, which is a well-known and trusted external service.
- [SAFE]: The mechanism for publishing decks uses a local, single-session loopback handshake for communication, ensuring that artifact submission remains within the controlled environment of the agent's platform.
Audit Metadata