Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process content from external, untrusted PDF files, which creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: PDFs are processed through multiple tools including
pypdf,pdfplumber,pdftotext, andpytesseract(OCR) as described inSKILL.mdandforms.md. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions in
forms.mdrequire the agent to generate intermediate JSON metadata and validation images for visual inspection, providing a manual oversight step before final document generation. - Capability inventory: The skill has file-writing capabilities via
pypdf,pdfplumber, andreportlab, and executes local Python scripts for validation and conversion. - Sanitization: No explicit string sanitization is present, but the workflow utilizes structured data validation via
scripts/check_bounding_boxes.pyto verify bounding box logic. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyperforms runtime modification of an external library method. - Evidence: The
monkeypatch_pydpf_methodfunction replacespypdf.generic.DictionaryObject.get_inheritedwith a custom implementation. This is used as a functional workaround to resolve a specific data type conflict in thepypdflibrary's form-writing logic.
Audit Metadata