brave-search-hardened
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses behavioral steering in
SKILL.mdandSAFETY.mdto influence agent decision-making. Specifically, it instructs the agent to avoid adding safety warnings or refusing queries based on 'API abuse' or 'rate limits' in certain contexts. This framing attempts to override the model's internal safety priors and refusal triggers. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
search.jsfetches Brave search results andcontent.jsfetches arbitrary URLs provided as arguments. - Boundary markers: None are present to delimit untrusted web content from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
fetchfor network requests andjsdomfor HTML parsing, outputting results directly to the console/chat. - Sanitization: The scripts use
turndownto convert HTML to Markdown, which provides basic structural sanitization but does not prevent the interpretation of malicious natural language instructions embedded in web content. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
SKILL.mdfile states that the skill 'Needs env: BRAVE_API_KEY', yet the providedsearch.jsscript scrapes the public Brave Search web interface (search.brave.com/search) and does not utilize the environment variable. This inconsistency could lead to unnecessary exposure or confusion regarding credential management.
Audit Metadata