jira-hardened
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection because it is designed to ingest and process content from external Jira tickets.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through issue titles, descriptions, and comments retrieved via CLI and MCP tool operations (referenced in
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers:
SKILL.mdprovides instructions to treat Jira content as untrusted input and recommends using specific patterns (e.g., quoting,/tmpfile input) to separate data from commands. - Capability inventory: The skill provides the agent with capabilities to execute shell commands via the
jiraCLI and perform broad Jira modifications using MCP tools. - Sanitization: The instructions explicitly warn the agent against direct interpolation of ticket content into shell strings, though enforcement relies on model compliance with the provided guidelines.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends the installation of the
jira-clitool from theankitpokhrel/jira-clirepository on GitHub. This is a well-known community tool for Jira interaction. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SAFETY.mdfile contains a security evaluation report and the skill name uses 'hardened' as a prefix. These represent self-referential safety claims that must be treated as informational data rather than authoritative proof of safety during analysis.
Audit Metadata