servicenow-agent-hardened
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a bundled Node.js CLI tool (
cli.mjs) to perform API requests against ServiceNow. It supports various subcommands for reading tables, fetching attachments, and inspecting schemas. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted data from external ServiceNow instances (e.g., ticket comments, attachment metadata, and service catalog variables).
- Ingestion points: Data is pulled via the Table API, Attachment API, and Service Catalog API endpoints.
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters for ServiceNow content are defined in the provided instruction files.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
node cli.mjsand write files to the local system using the--outflag in theattachcommand. - Sanitization: The
SAFETY.mddocumentation includes guardrails requiring the agent to inspect batch JSON files and refrain from piping output to network commands, providing a layer of human-in-the-loop and behavioral sanitization. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The instructions and the
SAFETY.mdfile include specific prohibitions against piping CLI output to network-transmitting commands (e.g.,curl,nc,ssh), significantly reducing the risk of exfiltrating sensitive organizational data. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill follows security best practices by directing users to store ServiceNow credentials (domain, username, password) in a local
.envfile rather than hardcoding them or passing them via insecure command-line history.
Audit Metadata