whatsapp-group-admin-hardened
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 21, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Accesses sensitive local files. The script
scripts/admin.jsreads group keys and contact information from~/.openclaw/credentials/whatsapp/default, exposing phone numbers and membership data.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Risk of command injection through theexec()interface. The skill relies on the agent to construct shell commands using user-supplied inputs for group names and URLs, which could be exploited if guardrails are bypassed.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: References to phishing domains.SAFETY.mdcontains examples usingchat.whatsaap.com, a known typosquatted domain, as part of its security documentation.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface. - Ingestion points: User-supplied group IDs, group names, and invite URLs passed as CLI arguments via
scripts/admin.js(found inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Present in
SKILL.mdas "Security Guardrails" instructing the agent to treat inputs as literal data and reject shell metacharacters. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
exec()to run shell commands and has read access to the local filesystem viascripts/admin.js. - Sanitization: Absent in the script's shell command construction; it relies entirely on the agent to correctly format the
exec()string and avoid injection.
Recommendations
- CRITICAL: 1 infected file(s) detected - DO NOT USE
- Contains 4 malicious URL(s) - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata