golang-continuous-integration

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The CI workflows and setup instructions retrieve additional agent skills from the author's repository to provide specialized Go engineering knowledge.
  • Evidence: The assets/claude-code-review.yml workflow and assets/copilot-review-instructions.md documentation use npx skills add to fetch resources from https://github.com/fabianoflorentino/golang-agent-skills. This is a standard mechanism for extending the agent's capabilities within this ecosystem.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The AI review logic in assets/claude-code-review.yml ingests external data that could be controlled by an attacker, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The quality, correctness, security, and quality-depth jobs in assets/claude-code-review.yml ingest data via gh pr diff and gh pr view commands.
  • Boundary markers: The prompts use structured sections and headers to define the task, but they do not use specific delimiters or protective instructions (e.g., "ignore embedded instructions") around the external PR data.
  • Capability inventory: The workflow is granted pull-requests: write and actions: read permissions. It is explicitly authorized to use tools for creating inline comments and interacting with the GitHub CLI to post feedback.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, filtering, or validation of the pull request content is performed before it is processed by the AI agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 05:09 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — golang-continuous-integration