golang-continuous-integration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The CI workflows and setup instructions retrieve additional agent skills from the author's repository to provide specialized Go engineering knowledge.
- Evidence: The
assets/claude-code-review.ymlworkflow andassets/copilot-review-instructions.mddocumentation usenpx skills addto fetch resources fromhttps://github.com/fabianoflorentino/golang-agent-skills. This is a standard mechanism for extending the agent's capabilities within this ecosystem. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The AI review logic in
assets/claude-code-review.ymlingests external data that could be controlled by an attacker, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: The
quality,correctness,security, andquality-depthjobs inassets/claude-code-review.ymlingest data viagh pr diffandgh pr viewcommands. - Boundary markers: The prompts use structured sections and headers to define the task, but they do not use specific delimiters or protective instructions (e.g., "ignore embedded instructions") around the external PR data.
- Capability inventory: The workflow is granted
pull-requests: writeandactions: readpermissions. It is explicitly authorized to use tools for creating inline comments and interacting with the GitHub CLI to post feedback. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, filtering, or validation of the pull request content is performed before it is processed by the AI agent.
Audit Metadata