edge-candidate-agent

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/auto_detect_candidates.py implements a --llm-ideas-cmd argument that allows the execution of arbitrary external commands via subprocess.run. This provides a significant surface for shell command execution if the input command string is influenced by an attacker.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/validate_candidate.py dynamically constructs a Python code snippet and executes it through a subprocess using uv run python -c. This runtime script generation and execution is a high-risk operation that could be abused if the interpolation of variables into the snippet is bypassed or manipulated.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests free-form text from 'hints' files and external process outputs to score and prioritize market candidates. Malicious content within these inputs can manipulate the agent's research prioritization and logic.\n
  • Ingestion points: The --hints YAML input and the output of the command provided to --llm-ideas-cmd in scripts/auto_detect_candidates.py.\n
  • Boundary markers: None. Content is parsed as structured data but used directly in logic scoring without isolation.\n
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (subprocess.run), local file creation and modification (write_outputs, export_candidate).\n
  • Sanitization: The skill performs basic alphanumeric sanitization for identifiers using regex, but lacks validation for the instructional content of hints processed during candidate scoring.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 15, 2026, 01:22 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — edge-candidate-agent