skill-idea-miner
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts
scripts/mine_session_logs.pyandscripts/score_ideas.pyexecute the externalclaudeCLI tool to perform LLM-based analysis. - Evidence: Uses
subprocess.run(["claude", "-p", ...])to pass prompts and data to the Claude CLI via standard input. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads and processes local session history files which may contain sensitive user data or proprietary code snippets.
- Evidence: Scans
~/.claude/projects/for.jsonlsession logs and extracts user messages and tool outputs. - Mitigation: The skill implements a
PROJECT_ALLOWLISTinmine_session_logs.pyto limit the scope of the file scan to specific directories. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface because it interpolates untrusted data from past session logs directly into prompts for the
claudeCLI. - Ingestion points: Extracted user messages and tool result errors from
~/.claude/projects/*.jsonl(found inscripts/mine_session_logs.py). - Boundary markers: Uses Markdown headers (e.g.,
## User Message Samples) as delimiters, which can be bypassed by adversarial content in the logs. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute the
claudeCLI and write to the local filesystem (YAML backlog files). - Sanitization: Truncates message samples to 200 characters and tool errors to 500 characters, but does not sanitize or escape the content before interpolation.
Audit Metadata