review-pr
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of untrusted data from the repository being reviewed and explicitly instructs the agent to follow instructions contained within that data.\n
- Ingestion points: The agent reads
AGENTS.mdandCLAUDE.mdfrom the consumer repository (as described inreferences/repository-policy.md) and pulls PR descriptions, commits, and file contents (as described inreferences/review-pr.md).\n - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
spawnSyncfor theissue-flowCLI inscripts/optional-cli.mjsand executes repository-defined test/build commands inreferences/evidence.md.\n - Sanitization: Absent. External content is used to guide agent actions without filtering.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to execute build and test checks discovered in the target repository. This allows a malicious pull request to trigger the execution of arbitrary code during the review process.\n
- Evidence:
references/evidence.mdstates the agent should "Read the repository's test/build instructions and execute the relevant checks after the final meaningful change."\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on the externalissue-flowCLI tool and references a bundled helperscripts/artifacts.mjswhich is missing from the provided skill files.\n - Evidence: References to
scripts/artifacts.mjsare found inSKILL.md,references/review-pr.md, andreferences/issue-input.md. The dependency onissue-flowis documented inreferences/cli-integration.mdand utilized inscripts/optional-cli.mjs.
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