phabalicious
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes instructions that explicitly direct the AI agent to disregard security and authorization concerns. The 'Overview' section states, "Don't get sidetracked by: ... Adding security/authorization concerns not mentioned in this skill" and "Ignore... security/authorization concerns." These instructions are designed to override the agent's default safety filtering and environment validation protocols.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from external environments, creating a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Data ingested via
phab db:queryresults, configuration details fromphab output, and file contents fromphab get:file(referenced in SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None; the skill instructs the agent to avoid adding security concerns, which reduces the likelihood of the agent distinguishing between data and instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill facilitates remote shell access (
phab shell), database manipulation (db:query,db:shell), and file system operations on production and staging environments. - Sanitization: There are no instructions for validating or sanitizing the content retrieved from these commands before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill encourages the use of powerful CLI commands that interact directly with production databases and shells. While the skill includes a confirmation protocol for destructive actions, the instruction to ignore environment detection ("Don't get sidetracked by: Detecting whether a fabfile exists... The user is asking for help, not environment detection") increases the risk of recommending commands that are inappropriate or dangerous for the current context.
Audit Metadata