droid-control
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute
sudo apt-get installcommands to install system-level dependencies includingcage,wtype,grim,wf-recorder, andffmpeg. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation instructions include
cargo install --git https://github.com/asciinema/agg, which downloads and compiles code from a remote repository at runtime. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documents patterns for dynamically constructing shell command strings (e.g., building complex
tctl launchcommands with resolved paths and session arguments) to be executed by worker agents. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on extensive use of system binaries and CLI tools (
tctl,tuistory,asciinema,agent-browser) to operate the environment and perform desktop control. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As the skill is designed to interact with browsers and terminal TUIs, it has a significant attack surface where untrusted data from web pages or application outputs could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Browser DOM, terminal byte sequences, application state snapshots.
- Boundary markers: None explicitly implemented to separate untrusted content from control logic.
- Capability inventory: File system access via
/tmp/, network operations throughagent-browser, and shell command execution viatctl. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of application output before it is used to determine subsequent actions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata