follow-up-on-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data which could contain malicious instructions designed to manipulate the agent.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches PR diffs, reviewer comments, and CI logs in Step 1 using
FetchUrlorgh pr view. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or specific "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities to execute shell commands via
git,gh, and various language-specific build/test tools (Step 5 and Step 7). - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or escaping the content fetched from the PR before the agent processes it to "address reviewer comments".
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on executing multiple CLI tools based on external input and repository state.
- The skill uses
gitfor branch management andgh(GitHub CLI) for PR interactions and metadata retrieval. - Step 5 encourages the execution of project-specific build, lint, and test commands which are variable and dependent on the repository's configuration.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically determines which commands to execute by reading project configuration files at runtime.
- In Step 5, the agent is instructed to discover build/test commands by reading files like
package.json,pyproject.toml,Makefile, etc., and then execute the discovered commands (e.g.,npm run test,pytest,cargo test). This is a standard part of the skill's developer-focused functionality but represents a dynamic execution pattern.
Audit Metadata