true-input

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from terminal PTY logs and screenshots captured from automated environments.
  • Ingestion points: The snapshot command (Linux), screenshot command (Linux), and shot commands (macOS/Windows) read output from terminal sessions and VM consoles into the agent's context.
  • Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify explicit delimiters or "ignore" instructions for the ingested terminal data, relying instead on the platform's isolated runtime directory or VM boundaries.
  • Capability inventory: The skill provides significant control over the environment, including keystroke injection (type, press), command execution (launch), and VM lifecycle management (up, down, kill).
  • Sanitization: While the Linux driver mentions a "scrubbed PTY log," the specific sanitization methods for removing potentially malicious escape sequences or embedded instructions are not detailed.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on external binaries and scripts provided by the Droid plugin ecosystem to interact with system-level services.
  • Evidence: Frequent use of ${DROID_PLUGIN_ROOT}/bin/tctl, mac-ctl.sh, and vm-ctl.sh to execute shell commands, manage sockets via socat, and interface with QEMU/virsh.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Setup instructions include commands requiring elevated permissions to install system dependencies.
  • Evidence: sudo apt-get install -y cage wtype grim wf-recorder in platforms/linux.md and requirements for libvirt/QEMU management on the host system.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 04:37 PM