preset-trigger
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
hacommand-line utility to perform task creation, list presets, and manage work hierarchies. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes an attack surface by instructing the agent to insert untrusted user input (such as task titles and work names) into shell command arguments.
- Ingestion points: Arguments for
--titlein theha task createandha work createcommands (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not specify sanitization or delimiters for the user-provided titles.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution via
ha task create,ha work create,ha work list,ha work show,ha agenda,ha task list, andha preset list(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: Absent; no escaping or validation of the
<title>or<work name>strings is described.
Audit Metadata