earnings-orchestrator

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from external financial news and search APIs, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/pit_fetch.py retrieves content bodies from Benzinga news and search results from Perplexity.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or system instructions used when interpolating this external data into the agent's context to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is configured with broad tool access in SKILL.md, including Bash, Write, and Edit capabilities.
  • Sanitization: The scripts perform basic text cleaning for formatting but do not implement security-focused sanitization or instruction filtering on external content.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple components of the skill perform shell command execution and access local system files.
  • Subprocess usage: scripts/get_quarterly_filings.py runs the column utility. The test suite (scripts/test_pit_fetch.py) uses subprocess.run to execute project scripts for verification purposes.
  • Transcript access: scripts/build-thinking-index.py programmatically reads agent session transcripts from the .claude/projects directory to build a research index. While this is an intended feature for indexing past work, it involves automated processing of sensitive interaction history.
  • Hooks: SKILL.md utilizes a PostToolUse hook to automatically trigger a Python script (build_orchestrator_event_json.py) after Bash commands are executed.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: unknown (check file) - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jun 17, 2026, 12:24 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — earnings-orchestrator