earnings-orchestrator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from external financial news and search APIs, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/pit_fetch.pyretrieves content bodies from Benzinga news and search results from Perplexity. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or system instructions used when interpolating this external data into the agent's context to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the data.
- Capability inventory: The skill is configured with broad tool access in
SKILL.md, includingBash,Write, andEditcapabilities. - Sanitization: The scripts perform basic text cleaning for formatting but do not implement security-focused sanitization or instruction filtering on external content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple components of the skill perform shell command execution and access local system files.
- Subprocess usage:
scripts/get_quarterly_filings.pyruns thecolumnutility. The test suite (scripts/test_pit_fetch.py) usessubprocess.runto execute project scripts for verification purposes. - Transcript access:
scripts/build-thinking-index.pyprogrammatically reads agent session transcripts from the.claude/projectsdirectory to build a research index. While this is an intended feature for indexing past work, it involves automated processing of sensitive interaction history. - Hooks:
SKILL.mdutilizes aPostToolUsehook to automatically trigger a Python script (build_orchestrator_event_json.py) afterBashcommands are executed.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: unknown (check file) - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata