anthropics-xlsx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses subprocess.run across several scripts (scripts/recalc.py, scripts/office/soffice.py, scripts/office/validators/redlining.py) to execute system commands like soffice, gcc, timeout, and git with arguments potentially influenced by file paths.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In scripts/office/soffice.py, the skill uses the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to inject a custom-compiled shared object into the soffice process, overriding standard system calls for socket management.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: scripts/recalc.py writes a StarBasic macro (Module1.xba) to the user's LibreOffice configuration directory (~/.config/libreoffice/...), which persists and is executed automatically to handle formula recalculation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted Office documents provided by users, which serves as a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided Office files processed via pandas.read_excel and XML parsers (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; instructions do not provide delimiters or warnings to ignore data-embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: Runtime compilation (gcc), process injection (LD_PRELOAD), subprocess execution (soffice, git), and file system write access.
  • Sanitization: Absent; content from spreadsheets is processed without explicit sanitization or escaping before being used in tool workflows.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's metadata contains deceptive identity information. The skill is named anthropics-xlsx and includes an official Anthropic license, but the author is identified as family3253, indicating potential impersonation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 15, 2026, 08:18 AM