wenxian
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes a shell script
scripts/sync_share_repo_jcr.shthat clones an external, unverified GitHub repository (https://github.com/yongqianxiao/share_repo.git) to fetch reference data. This source is not part of the trusted vendors list, presenting a supply chain risk. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The file
scripts/sync_share_repo_jcr.shexecutes system-level commands, specificallygit cloneandrsync, to manage local file synchronization from the remote repository. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructions for the EasyScholar API require sending the
secretKeyas a query parameter in a GET request (https://www.easyscholar.cc/open/getPublicationRank?secretKey=<EASYSCHOLAR_SECRET_KEY>...). This is an insecure transmission method as credentials can be exposed in server logs, proxy logs, and browser history. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from PubMed (Phase A) and performs analysis in Phase B to generate structured summaries. It lacks explicit boundary markers or sanitization logic to handle potentially malicious instructions embedded in scientific abstracts. Given the agent has the capability to send messages to external communication channels via the
messagetool, this creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
Audit Metadata