inngest
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides patterns and examples for building AI agents (e.g., in
references/ai/agent-tool-loop.md) that ingest untrusted data which can influence the agent's logic. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through event payloads, such as
event.data.messagein the provided ReAct loop examples. - Boundary markers: The documented code samples lack explicit delimiters or instructions to the LLM to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in the input data.
- Capability inventory: The described agent workflows possess significant capabilities, including tool execution and data processing, which can be manipulated via prompt injection.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation for external natural language content before it is interpolated into LLM prompts in the examples provided.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation includes instructions for installing platform tools via remote shell scripts.
- Evidence: The skill references
curl -sSfL https://cli.inngest.com/install.sh | shfor CLI installation inreferences/platform/dev-server.mdandscripts/setup.md. - Note: These downloads originate from the official Inngest domain (
inngest.com), representing standard and expected behavior for this platform's reference skill. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively documents and encourages the use of various command-line interface tools for development, testing, and deployment.
- Evidence: Numerous files in the
scripts/andreferences/platform/directories describe the use ofinngest dev,npx inngest-cli, and package managers (npm,pip) to interact with the system.
Audit Metadata