build-design-library
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external URLs during the research phase, which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent.
- Ingestion points:
references/research.mdspecifies capturing public page HTML and screenshots via thefirecrawltool for competitor research. - Boundary markers: The skill relies on a system of "independent reviewer receipts" and "decision owner" approvals defined in
SKILL.mdto gate transitions between phases, acting as a manual check against automated obedience to injected instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
agent-browserfor rendered proof,firecrawlfor scraping, and various shell commands for building, linting, and testing as described inSKILL.mdandreferences/verification.md. - Sanitization:
references/design-and-data.mddescribes mapping raw service errors through approved product copy, andtemplates/shared-scenario-data-contract.mdincludes a requirement for a "Secret scan command" to identify sensitive data leaks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill process involves sourcing components from external registries and repositories.
references/component-sourcing.mddescribes using registry commands to fetch files and installing packages as part of the sourcing workflow. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute various system commands for environment setup, building, linting, and live verification, such as
agent-browser,design-qatools, and project-specific startup commands defined inSKILL.mdandreferences/verification.md.
Audit Metadata