prd-to-slices
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data which serves as a potential vector for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads PRD files located at
projects/<project>/specs/prds/PRD-*.mdand explores arbitrary modules within the codebase to identify vertical boundaries (Step 1, Step 2). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions provided to the agent to treat the content of the PRD or codebase as untrusted data or to use delimiters to separate these inputs from the skill's operational instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands via the
wikiCLI tool, which includes writing to the backlog, creating new specification files, and updating project indices (Step 5, Step 6, Step 9). - Sanitization: Absent. The skill uses content derived from the PRD to populate command arguments (such as
<title>) and file contents (implementation and test plans) without defined validation or filtering steps. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently invokes a local CLI tool named
wikito manage the project lifecycle. These commands includecreate-issue-slice,forge plan,forge run,update-index,lint, andlint-semantic. While these appear to be project-specific management tools, their execution is driven by the interpretation of external PRD documents.
Audit Metadata