tdd
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a workflow where the agent ingests and acts upon external data sources, creating a potential surface for indirect injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read domain language documentation, Architecture Decision Records (ADRs), and the output of executed test commands in the
SKILL.mdfile. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded prompts within the domain language or test outputs are defined.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to write to the file system (creating code and tests) and execute shell commands (running the test suite) via the
wiki forgetool suite. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is present to filter potentially malicious instructions embedded in the external data before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow relies on the execution of shell commands to verify code behavior.
- Evidence: The
SKILL.mdfile explicitly instructs the agent to run commands such aswiki forge tdd red,wiki forge tdd green, andwiki forge tdd cycleto progress through the development cycle. These commands incorporate user-provided or agent-generated strings as arguments for test execution.
Audit Metadata