falco

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the user or agent to install the falco tool from a personal GitHub repository (github.com/ysugimoto/falco). This involves downloading and executing code from an external, non-official source that is not listed in the trusted vendor list.
  • Evidence: Installation commands go install github.com/ysugimoto/falco/cmd/falco@latest and git clone https://github.com/ysugimoto/falco.git in SKILL.md and references/understanding-vcl-from-source.md.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of various CLI tools and scripts to perform its functions, including falco, terraform, git, make, and curl for linting, testing, and simulation.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied VCL files and encourages the agent to read their content to understand logic, which presents an attack surface for instructions embedded in external data.
  • Ingestion points: VCL (.vcl) and XVCL (.xvcl) files, and Terraform plans (planned.out) processed by the falco CLI and read by the agent as instructed in SKILL.md and references/terraform-vcl.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. No instructions are provided to the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions when reading user-provided VCL files.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands via falco, write to files (falco fmt -w), and initiate network connections via proxy mode (falco simulate --proxy).
  • Sanitization: Absent. No mention of sanitizing or validating the content of VCL files before they are processed by the tool or read by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 6, 2026, 11:40 AM