falco
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the user or agent to install the
falcotool from a personal GitHub repository (github.com/ysugimoto/falco). This involves downloading and executing code from an external, non-official source that is not listed in the trusted vendor list. - Evidence: Installation commands
go install github.com/ysugimoto/falco/cmd/falco@latestandgit clone https://github.com/ysugimoto/falco.gitinSKILL.mdandreferences/understanding-vcl-from-source.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of various CLI tools and scripts to perform its functions, including
falco,terraform,git,make, andcurlfor linting, testing, and simulation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied VCL files and encourages the agent to read their content to understand logic, which presents an attack surface for instructions embedded in external data.
- Ingestion points: VCL (
.vcl) and XVCL (.xvcl) files, and Terraform plans (planned.out) processed by thefalcoCLI and read by the agent as instructed inSKILL.mdandreferences/terraform-vcl.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. No instructions are provided to the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions when reading user-provided VCL files.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands via
falco, write to files (falco fmt -w), and initiate network connections via proxy mode (falco simulate --proxy). - Sanitization: Absent. No mention of sanitizing or validating the content of VCL files before they are processed by the tool or read by the agent.
Audit Metadata