codex-advisor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/ask_codex.mjsexecutes thecodexCLI tool usingspawnSync. This functionality relies on thecodexbinary being present in the user's environment.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests recent conversation history from a transcript file to provide context for the review. This creates an attack surface where instructions embedded in previous user or assistant messages could influence the reviewer model's behavior. - Ingestion points:
scripts/ask_codex.mjsreads the file specified by the--transcriptCLI argument. - Boundary markers: The script uses
<recent-conversation>and<question>XML-style tags to delimit the context within the final prompt. - Capability inventory: The reviewer model is executed via the
codextool with a--sandbox read-onlyflag, which aims to prevent state-mutating actions like file writes or network calls during the review process. - Sanitization: The script filters the transcript for specific JSON message types and truncates long strings, but it does not perform sanitization of the underlying text content to prevent prompt injection.- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads the conversation history, which may contain sensitive project information or credentials, and passes it to the
codextool for analysis. Depending on thecodextool's configuration, this data may be sent to a remote model provider.
Audit Metadata