fable-advisor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/ask_fable.mjsusesspawnSyncto execute theclaudeCLI tool. It passes user-provided data from standard input directly to this process usingstdio: "inherit". - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from standard input, as demonstrated in the execution instructions in
SKILL.md(node scripts/ask_fable.mjs <<'REVIEW' ...). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are used when passing the input to the sub-agent.
- Capability inventory: The
claudesub-agent is explicitly initialized with file-system access tools (Read,Grep,Glob), which could be abused if the input contains malicious instructions. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering before the data is processed by the AI model.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script attempts to read a configuration file from a path outside of the skill's own directory structure (
../../../claude-agents/fable-advisor.md), which creates a dependency on a specific local environment layout.
Audit Metadata