reproduce
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches external content from sources including ArXiv, GitHub, and Hugging Face. It use tools like
wget,curl, andaria2cto download datasets from URLs specified in papers or repositories. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The workflow clones external repositories via
git cloneand executes the contained code usingpython train.py. This pattern allows for the execution of arbitrary code from untrusted external sources. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently invokes shell commands such as
gh,git,uv, andpythonto manage dependencies and execute workloads. This provides a broad surface for command-related risks if inputs are not properly handled. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In Stage 4 and Stage 6, the agent is directed to write Python scripts such as
train.pyandsmoke_forward.pybased on its analysis of the paper and then execute those scripts to verify implementation. This involves runtime assembly and execution of code. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data extracted from external papers and code repositories, creating a risk that malicious instructions hidden in these sources could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Arxiv HTML extracted via Tavily and code repositories cloned via Git as seen in
references/01-paper-fetch.mdandreferences/02-code-clone.md. - Boundary markers: Content is organized into structured markdown files, but there are no explicit safety instructions to ignore potential injection markers within the extracted text.
- Capability inventory: File system access, network downloads, package installation, and arbitrary Python code execution.
- Sanitization: Content is copied verbatim into local extracts without filtering for malicious prompt patterns.
Audit Metadata