project-setup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses automated detection to parse files like
README.mdandpackage.json, which could contain malicious prompts designed to hijack the configuration process or influence future AI sessions. - Ingestion points: Reads and analyzes
package.json,pyproject.toml,go.mod,Cargo.toml,pom.xml,README.md, and other project configuration files to infer the stack and architectural patterns. - Boundary markers: None. The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when reading content from these external project files.
- Capability inventory: Performs file writes (
CLAUDE.md,AGENTS.md, and theai-context/directory) and persists data to a long-term memory store using themem_savetool. - Sanitization: None. The skill directly uses detected strings from project files to populate documentation templates and memory entries without evident escaping or validation.
- [PERSISTENCE_MECHANISMS]: The skill is designed to maintain state across sessions by writing to a persistent memory layer.
- Evidence: Steps 4 and I8 explicitly call
mem_savewith topic keys likeproject-setup/{project-name}to store project context in the 'Engram' persistence layer. - [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses files outside the current project directory, specifically targeting the user's home folder.
- Evidence: Step I2 instructs the agent to read templates from
~/.claude/docs/templates/project-claude-template.mdand fallback paths like~/claude-config/docs/.
Audit Metadata