sdd-init
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by processing untrusted data from project and user files.
- Ingestion points: The skill scans for
*/SKILL.mdfiles in project directories and the user's home directory (~/.claude/skills/), and it reads files likeagents.md,CLAUDE.md, and.cursorrules. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to separate the ingested content from the agent's internal logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the file system (
Writetool) and persist data to a memory tool (mem_save). - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation or sanitization for the content extracted from these external sources.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive paths within the user's home directory.
- It scans
~/.claude/skills/to build a skill registry. While this is necessary for its function as a skill manager, accessing hidden directories in the user's home folder increases the potential exposure surface for user-specific configurations.
Audit Metadata