llm-wiki
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands via the
terminaltool for system configuration, such as setting upsystemduser services and usingsudo loginctl enable-lingerto establish persistence for background synchronization tasks. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly advises generating Python scripts in the
/tmp/directory and running them via theterminaltool to "avoid inline script security scanning entirely." This constitutes a deliberate technique to evade security monitoring mechanisms. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions recommend installing third-party software (
obsidian-headless) from an external package registry and provide links to external GitHub repositories that are not identified as verified sources. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting content from arbitrary URLs and documents (PDF, Word) without implementing boundary markers or "ignore embedded instructions" safeguards.
- Ingestion points:
web_extractfor URLs,read_filefor local document text. - Boundary markers: Absent.
- Capability inventory: File system access, shell command execution, and dynamic Python execution.
- Sanitization: Absent.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Instructions include managing environment variables in
.envfiles and provide templates for login commands using placeholders for credentials. While placeholders are used, the workflow involves handling authentication data within the agent's execution environment.
Audit Metadata