deep-debug
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external sources that could contain malicious instructions designed to influence subagents.
- Ingestion points: Error logs are read from the filesystem in
commands/debug.md, and network/console logs are gathered via Chrome MCP tools as described inrules/chrome-evidence-tools.md. - Boundary markers: The prompts in
templates/parallel-agent-prompts.mduse headers likeEVIDENCE:to separate data from instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill can launch parallel subagents, execute shell commands, and run JavaScript in a browser context.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or escaping of the ingested data is performed before it is interpolated into agent prompts.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of JavaScript within the browser page context for state inspection.
- Evidence: In
rules/chrome-evidence-tools.mdandSKILL.md, the agent is instructed to usemcp__claude-in-chrome__javascript_toolto run snippets likeJSON.stringify(localStorage)or access React internals. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill runs local shell commands to retrieve project context and logs.
- Evidence: The
/debugcommand incommands/debug.mdexecutestail -50 logs/error.log,git log, andgit diff. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill contains conflicting author and repository information in its metadata files.
- Evidence: The
.claude-plugin/plugin.jsonfile identifies the author as "Jeremy Dawes" and the repository as a jezweb GitHub account, which contradicts the provided skill author context of "fefogarcia".
Audit Metadata