bear-trace

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute the sci (scimaster-cli) tool via the shell to check versions, authenticate, and perform literature searches. Commands are constructed using arguments derived from user input.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation instructs users to install the scimaster-cli package from NPM. This introduces a third-party dependency into the execution environment that is not part of the trusted core libraries.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill performs indirect prompt injection by ingesting abstracts and titles from external research databases. Malicious instructions embedded in paper metadata could potentially influence the agent's future actions.
  • Ingestion points: Paper titles, author names, and abstracts retrieved via the sci search command in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill formats retrieved data into markdown tables and HTML structures but lacks explicit security boundaries to prevent the agent from interpreting instructions found within the data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (sci) and perform local file writes (creating directories and report files).
  • Sanitization: The instructions focus on translating abstracts to Chinese but do not specify any security-related sanitization or validation of the retrieved content.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 13, 2026, 01:38 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — bear-trace