od-prototype-social-carousel
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill follows instructions from the
open-designMCP server to author files. - Ingestion points: The output of the
prepare_open_design_brieftool inSKILL.mdis used as the primary source for file-editing instructions. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or 'ignore previous instructions' warnings applied to the data received from the tool output.
- Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to use its own file-editing tools to create content based on external instructions, involving file write operations.
- Sanitization: The skill lacks logic to validate or escape the instructions returned by the MCP tool before execution.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: User input via
$ARGUMENTSis directly embedded into the tool's input brief. - Evidence: The brief construction
Brief: "$ARGUMENTS"inSKILL.mdallows unvalidated user text to be passed to theprepare_open_design_brieftool, creating a surface where an attacker could potentially manipulate the tool's parameters or the agent's behavior through the brief content.
Audit Metadata