open-design-recurring
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an attack surface by ingesting data from external sources and using it to inform the execution of design jobs.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is retrieved from external sources like CSV files, Google Sheets, or Notion databases as specified in the
sourcesfield of job files defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or boundary markers to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
start_open_design_job_runandfinish_open_design_job_runto execute a "brief" which acts as a set of natural language instructions for the design process. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation for the data pulled from external connectors before it is processed by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation within the skill directs users to download and execute a setup utility from a remote repository.
- Evidence: The skill recommends running
npx @feimacode/open-design-agent-kit init --tool claudeto initialize the environment. - Context: The package is a vendor-owned resource originating from the skill's author (
feimacode). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates a job file (
.open-design/jobs/<id>.job.md) that contains natural language instructions (the "brief"), which are interpreted and executed at runtime during the "Run" phase. - Evidence: The "Set up" section describes writing the job file and subsequently executing it via
start_open_design_job_run.
Audit Metadata