openspec-onboard
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data by scanning codebase comments (TODO, FIXME, HACK, XXX) and git logs to suggest improvement tasks. This introduces a potential surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions hidden in code comments could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Phase 2: Task Selection) scans local source code files and git history. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore potential prompts within the scanned content.
- Capability inventory: The skill can create directories, write multiple markdown files to the local file system, and execute the
openspecCLI tool. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the content found in codebase comments is mentioned before the agent processes and presents it.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local system commands to verify environment readiness and perform workflow actions.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdexecutesopenspec --version,git log --oneline -10,openspec new change,openspec instructions proposal,mkdir -p, andopenspec archiveacross various phases of the onboarding process.
Audit Metadata