nanobanana-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a Python script (
nanobanana.py) using bash commands, interpolating user-provided inputs such as prompts and filenames directly into the command arguments. This pattern presents a risk of command injection if the agent does not properly escape characters or validate the input before execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user content to generate images, which could be used to influence the behavior of the underlying image model or the agent itself.
- Ingestion points: User-provided text strings for the
--promptargument and image files for the--inputargument innanobanana.py. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the script or instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to write files to the local filesystem (
image.save) and make external network requests to the Gemini API. - Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit sanitization or validation logic for the content of the prompts or the format of input images before they are passed to the API.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation recommends installing several Python packages (
python-dotenv,httpx[socks],google-genai,Pillow) viapip. These packages are from well-known registries and include official SDKs from Google. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill script reads configuration data from
~/.nanobanana.envto retrieve theGEMINI_API_KEY. While this is a sensitive file path, it is a standard practice for local secret management within this skill's architecture.
Audit Metadata