transcribe-video
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions in
SKILL.mdutilize shell commands (such asffprobeandffmpeg) that interpolate user-provided file paths within double quotes. While quoting provides basic protection against spaces, it does not prevent command injection if the filename contains shell-active characters like backticks or subshells, especially if the agent platform executes these strings directly in a shell environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's setup instructions include installing
openaiandpython-dotenvfrom the official Python package registry (PyPI). These are trusted, well-known packages commonly used in the industry for API interaction and configuration management. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external media files and their metadata, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Input file paths and embedded subtitle streams from local video files (referenced in
SKILL.mdand processed intranscribe.py). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or specific instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded content within the video metadata or filenames.
- Capability inventory: The skill can read local files, write new transcript files to the filesystem, execute system commands via subprocesses, and perform network requests to the OpenAI API.
- Sanitization: While the
transcribe.pyscript uses the safer list-based argument format forsubprocess.run, the markdown-based instructions for the agent rely on simple string interpolation, which represents a lower degree of sanitization for shell execution.
Audit Metadata