commit-work
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from the local working tree through git operations, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if malicious instructions are embedded in the code being reviewed.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from the working tree via
git status,git diff, andgit diff --cachedas described inSKILL.md(Steps 1 and 4). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters or warnings to isolate the code content from the agent's internal logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell access to execute
gitcommands and project-specific verification tools (unit tests, lint, build) as noted inSKILL.md(Steps 1, 3, 4, 6, and 7). - Sanitization: Absent. The workflow does not include steps to sanitize or filter the content of the diffs before the agent interprets them for commit message generation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function involves executing a series of shell commands to manage the git workflow and verify code quality.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdexplicitly directs the agent to rungit status,git diff,git add,git commit, and arbitrary project verification commands such as linting, testing, or building in Step 7.
Audit Metadata