tanstack-ai
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the processing of external data (user messages and tool outputs) which are subsequently interpreted by Large Language Models.
- Ingestion points: The
messagesarray is ingested via thechat()function inSKILL.mdand server-side route handlers inreferences/server-setup.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit prompt delimiters or boundary instructions are included in the code examples, which is typical for library documentation but presents a standard surface for injection attacks.
- Capability inventory: The skill supports full agentic cycles and tool execution on both server and client environments (documented in
references/tools.md). - Sanitization: Input validation is handled via Zod schemas for tool inputs, providing a layer of structure, though general message content is passed through to adapters as-is.
Audit Metadata