create-compelling-prs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to fetch and follow instructions from external sources such as repository playbooks (
GET /admin/playbooks/<org>/<repo>),CONTRIBUTING.md, andPULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.mdto resolve deployment evidence requirements. If these files are compromised or contain malicious instructions, they could influence the agent's behavior during the PR creation process. - Ingestion points: The agent is directed to read and parse repo playbooks and Markdown files located in the target repository.
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions in these external files are provided.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Write,Read,Glob, andGreptools, which allow for file system modification and command execution. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from these external files before the agent processes them.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to execute shell commands to satisfy PR requirements and audits.
- The instructions explicitly require the agent to "Run the full test suite now" and "Screenshot the affected page" using tools like Playwright or
pylot-cli. - The "Lead Self-Assessment Loop" reinforces this by demanding the agent perform actions (commands) rather than just making claims, which increases the frequency of shell interaction.
Audit Metadata