deps-runner
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 4, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
gitpod environment sshacross multiple stages (02-05) to execute arbitrary shell commands in remote environments, including service management (pkill), git identity modification, and build/test tool execution.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In Stage 05, the skill invokes theclaudeCLI on a remote Gitpod environment with the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag. This allows a sub-agent to autonomously generate and execute code (writing and running tests) without user oversight or approval.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill accesses sensitive platform environment variables, specificallyPYLOT_DISPATCH_TOKENfor API authentication withPYLOT_APIand$GITCONFIG(extracted from platform secrets) to configure git identities.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8).\n - Ingestion points: Pull request metadata (titles, branches) and repository files (diffs,
package.json,Gemfile,requirements.txt) are fetched viaghandgitCLI tools.\n - Boundary markers: No delimiters or protective instructions are provided to sub-agents or the
claude -pinvocation when processing untrusted PR data.\n - Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities, including remote shell access, package installation, Docker builds, and autonomous agent triggers.\n
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of external data before it is passed into execution contexts.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata