flowchad-runner
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads browser binaries via
npx playwrightand the Vercel CLI at runtime during the preflight and walk stages. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of shell commands for repository management (
git), GitHub CLI (gh) for PR interactions and API calls, and Vercel for on-demand deployments. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates Javascript automation recipes at runtime and sends them to a worker devbox for execution via Playwright. This involves inlining code snippets into prompts sent to a separate execution environment.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted configuration and flow definitions from the target repository, particularly when triggered by a Pull Request. These YAML files contain natural language instructions in fields like
expectthat the agent interprets to judge flow success. - Ingestion points: Repository files (
.flowchad/config.ymland.flowchad/flows/*.yml) and PR metadata. - Boundary markers: Absent; the subagent prompts for processing these files do not include explicit instructions to ignore potentially malicious embedded content.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses capabilities for shell execution, network access to third-party and internal APIs, and browser automation.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or schema-based validation is performed on the natural language strings retrieved from the repository files before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata