flowchad-runner

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads browser binaries via npx playwright and the Vercel CLI at runtime during the preflight and walk stages.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of shell commands for repository management (git), GitHub CLI (gh) for PR interactions and API calls, and Vercel for on-demand deployments.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates Javascript automation recipes at runtime and sends them to a worker devbox for execution via Playwright. This involves inlining code snippets into prompts sent to a separate execution environment.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted configuration and flow definitions from the target repository, particularly when triggered by a Pull Request. These YAML files contain natural language instructions in fields like expect that the agent interprets to judge flow success.
  • Ingestion points: Repository files (.flowchad/config.yml and .flowchad/flows/*.yml) and PR metadata.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the subagent prompts for processing these files do not include explicit instructions to ignore potentially malicious embedded content.
  • Capability inventory: The agent possesses capabilities for shell execution, network access to third-party and internal APIs, and browser automation.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or schema-based validation is performed on the natural language strings retrieved from the repository files before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 6, 2026, 01:04 PM