write-report
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill retrieves a
QUEST_TOKENby reading a sensitive environment file at a hardcoded absolute path:/home/ubuntu/projects/fellowship-dev/claude-buddy/.env. While the path appears associated with the vendor's project structure, hardcoding absolute paths to sensitive configuration files is a security risk. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
python3 -cto execute dynamically generated code. In Step 4, the shell variables$REPORT_TITLEand$GROUPare interpolated directly into the Python source string. This lacks proper escaping or parameterization, allowing for potential Python code injection if these variables contain single quotes or other escape sequences. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs multiple system operations including file writing, directory resolution via
git rev-parse, and network transmission viacurl. Thecurlcommand specifically sends data to a local API (127.0.0.1:4242) using the token harvested from the.envfile. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect injection as it processes untrusted inputs (such as report titles and job manifests) without boundary markers or sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Inputs provided via the
--jobsflag and environment variables like$REPORT_TITLEand$GROUPused in Step 4. - Boundary markers: Absent; the content is processed directly.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess calls to
git,python3, andcurl; file write operations. - Sanitization: Absent; variables are directly interpolated into script strings.
Audit Metadata