flow-report
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a shell command to locate snapshot directories by directly interpolating the user-provided
{flow-name}variable. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands by providing a malicious flow name containing command separators like semicolons or pipes. - Evidence:
ls -d .flowchad/snapshots/*-{flow-name} | sort -r | head -1in Step 1. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external files and URLs, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where data can hijack the agent's logic.
- Ingestion points:
snapshots/{latest}-{flow-name}/results.json(Step 1),flows/{flow-name}.yml(Step 5), andevidenceURLs (Step 4). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed data files.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution via
lsand file system write access for report generation. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any validation or filtering of the content read from external files before processing it.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata