lark-unified
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill setup involves installing the
@larksuite/clipackage from the official npm registry. This is the official developer tool provided by the platform vendor (Lark/Feishu). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/lark_setup.pyscript uses the Pythonsubprocessmodule to call thelark-clitool for configuration. The script correctly passes arguments as a list rather than using a shell string, preventing command injection. Additionally, the skill guides the agent to uselark-clivia theBashtool for its primary operations, which is intended behavior. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data (Lark messages, emails, and cloud documents) which creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. Malicious instructions embedded in these external sources could theoretically attempt to influence the agent's logic.
- Ingestion points: Documented commands such as
+chat-messages-list,+messages-search, and+docs-getinSKILL.mdand reference files. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or boundary markers are instructed for the agent when interpolating this external content into prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities via the
Bashtool, including the ability to send messages, delete files, and update database records across the Lark platform. - Sanitization: The documentation in
references/lark-mail.mdexplicitly warns that email content should be treated as untrusted input and recommends sanitization, though no automated sanitization script is provided within the skill itself.
Audit Metadata